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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION I 
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP 
mdFARMERSINSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, 




NATURE OF CASE 
The case on appeal and set forth herein involves the 
problem and presents the question of whether or not 
plaintiff, an excess liability insurance carrier, can recover 
attorneys' fees and court costs from defendants, the 
primary liability insurance carrier, when the latter has 
failed, refused and neglected to defend an insured under 
the terms of its policy, who is also the named insured 
under the policy providing excess coverage, when the 
insured was being sued by a third party for an amount 
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within the limits of coverage provided by the primary 
carrier, and when upon its refusal to defend said insured, 
the excess carrier incurred attorneys' fees in a reason-
able amount and court costs in successfully defending 
the insured party. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial Court (Judge A. H. Ellett) held 
that an excess liability insurance carrier cannot recover 
attorneys' fees and court costs from a primary insurance 
carrier which fees and costs were incurred in defending 
a party who was an insured under the policy providing 
primary coverage and who was the named insured under 
the policy providing excess coverage when the insured 
was being sued for an amount within the policy limits pro-
vided by the primary carrier. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The relief sought on this appeal is as follows: 
A. Reversal of the lower Court's decision. 
B. Order directing judgment to be entered in favor 
of plaintiff and against defendants for the amount stipu-
lated to by counsel at trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John H. Morgan, Jr., was the named insured under a 
policy of liability insurance issued to him by National 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company and 
providing coverage on a 1958 Mercury automobile in 
the amount of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per oc-
currence for bodily injury and $5,000 for property dam-
age (TR 2, 7). 
Raymond Earl Thomas was the named insured under 
a policy of liability insurance issued to him by Farmers 
Insurance Exchange and providing coverage on his auto-
mobile in the amount of $10,000 per person and $20,000 
per occurrence for bodily injury and $5,000 for property 
damage (TR 2, 7). 
Mr. Morgan had purchased his vehicle at Bountiful 
Motor Sales (then known as J. Golden Barton Motor 
Company) where Mr. Thomas was employed as a car 
salesman; however, Morgan did not purchase his car 
from Thomas (TR 2). While Mr. Morgan was vacation-
ing in Yellowstone Park in August, 1958, his vehicle was 
involved in an automobile accident. He brought the 
damaged automobile to Bountiful Motor Sales, Bountiful, 
Utah, for repairs. In the course of the discussion be-
tween Mr. Morgan and Kay Browning, Service Manager 
of Bountiful Motor Sales, a request was made by the 
customer for the use of a service automobile while his 
car was being repaired. Mr. Browning advised that no 
such vehicle was available and obtained the use of the 
automobile owned by Raymond Earl Thomas for Mr. 
2\Iorgan (TR. 3). The borrowed automobile was owned by 
~Ir. Thomas, and was insured under a policy issued to 
him by Farmers Insurance Exchange, which he had o b-
tained on his own behalf (TR 3). Upon receiving the car 
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from its owner, Mr. Morgan drove to his home, parked it 
on an incline nearby and went into his house. Shortly 
thereafter Mr. Morgan's young daughter entered the 
parked car, released the brake and sent it crashing into 
the home of Daniel T. Wolfe, damaging the house in the 
amount of $1,896.31 ( TR. 3, 4). Demand was made upon 
Mr. Morgan by the owner of the house for the damages 
thereto, and Morgan immediately contacted his insurance 
carrier, appellant herein. He was advised that the cover-
age of National Farmers Union Property and Casualty 
Company was excess in this situation and that he ought 
to look to Farmers Insurance Group, the insurer of the 
automobile causing the damage, for protection. This was 
done and Mr. Morgan was advised that no coverage was 
afforded by Farmers Insurance Exchange in this situa-
tion because its coverage was excess and in any event 
coverage was excluded because the loaned vehicle was 
being used in the automobile business at the time and 
place of the accident. 
In the meantime, legal action was instituted against 
Mr. Morgan by Mr. Wolfe for the damages to his house; 
Morgan thereupon again sought protection from appel-
lant herein, who undertook the defense of the matter only 
after the defense had been tendered to both Farmers In-
surance Exchange and Bountiful :Motor Sales and refused 
by both. Thereupon appellant herein, plaintiff in the 
lower Court, proceeded with the defense of the lawsuit 
against Mr. Morgan, was successful in that endeavor, but 
in so doing incurred court costs and attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $506.00 ( TR. 4, 5, 6) 
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An action was subsequently commenced in the Third 
Judicial District Court by appellant against respondents 
to recover the attorneys' fees and court costs incurred 
by it in defending the lawsuit described. The lower court 
disposed of the rna tter as previously indica ted in this 
brief (Tr. 4). 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT 'I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN 
ACCEPTING THE DEFENSE OF THE IN-
SURED, UPON DEFENDANTS' REFUSAL TO 
DO SO, PLAINTIFF WAS A VOLUNTEER 
AND THEREFORE PRECLUDED FROM RE-
COVERING ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT 
COSTS INCURRED IN DEFENDING THE 
INSURED. 
At the outset it may be well to indicate that in deny-
ing recovery against defendants by plaintiff, the lower 
court did not use the word volunteer. However, an exami-
nation of the language used by the court in describing 
plaintiff's conduct in handling the matter or in indicating 
what plaintiff should or could have done, it is evident that 
the court held that plaintiff was a volunteer (Tr. 10, 11). 
Generally speaking the party making payment is a vol-
unteer if in so doing he has no right or interest of his 
own to protect and acts without obligation, moral or 
legal, and without being requested by anyone liable on 
the obligation. Where the person paying the debt has an 
interest to protect he is not a stranger (50 Am. Jur., 698, 
Section 22) . 
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The problem involved in this appeal presents a case 
of first impression in Utah but which has been dealt with 
recently in several other states . 
.Aetna Casualty & Surety Compa;ny v. Buckeye Union 
CasuaUy Company, 157 Ohio St. 385, 105 N. E. 2d 568 
(1952) discussed the volunteer aspect of a claim on facts 
similar to those in the instant case. However, in the Ohio 
case, Aetna, the secondary liability insurer, settled an 
action for an amount within policy limits brought against 
the insured party and ,sought to recover from Buckeye, 
the primary insurer, the amount of the settlement and 
costs in the sum of $2,660.81. The primary carrier had 
disclaimed coverage refusing to defend or participate in 
the settlement of the action. It should be noted at this 
time that both the Aetna and Buckeye policies contained 
Temporary Use of Substitute Automobile, Other Insur-
ance, Subrogation, and Defense provisions the same or 
similar to those contained in the policy of the parties to 
this appeal. (See exhibits P-1 and D-2). The Ohio Su-
preme Court held that Aetna, as the secondary carrier, 
which was forced to make settlement and pay to protect 
itself, was entitled to recover from Buckeye, the primary 
carrier. In allowing recovery, the Court had this to say: 
Therefore, applying the principles of equity and 
natural justice, Aetna has the equitable right to 
recover from Buckeye and it also has the right to 
recover by way of subrogation under the policy. 
The .Aetna ca,se is distinguishable from Farm Bureau Mu-
tual Insurance Company v. Buckeye Union Casualty Com-
pany, 147 Ohio St. 79, 67 N.E. 2d 906, on which Buckeye 
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relied to avoid liability in the former case because in the 
Farm Bureau case both companies admitted coverage and 
the liabilities of their insured for some amount of dam-
ages on the claim asserted. No action was instituted 
against the insured and the Farm Bureau made full set-
tlement without being forced to do so by court action. 
Furthermore, the case did not involve primary and sec-
ondary coverage problems. Under those circumstances 
the court held that there was no legal liability requiring 
the settling company to make payment and consequently 
that it was a volunteer. 
A very recent Illinois case, Fireman's Fund Indem-
nity Comparny v. Freeport Insurance Compa.ny, 30 Ill. 
App. 2d 69, 173 N.E. 2d 543 (1961) involved another pri-
mary-secondary insurance coverage dispute. There, Gail 
Saraniecki, the gir 1 friend of the son of the named insured 
drove the insured car at the time of the accident with 
implied permission of the insured. The girl's father had 
a policy of insurance providing coverage upon himself 
and members of his family while driving other vehicles. 
A $100,000.00 suit was filed against the girl for injuries 
arising out of the accident. She notified Freeport Insur-
ance Company, the liability carrier on the automobile she 
was driving, but it denied liability under the policy and 
refused to defend. She also notified Fireman's Fund, her 
father's insurance carrier, and it defended the action 
upon Freeport's refusal to do so. Fireman's Fund 
brought a declaratory judgment action for reimburse-
ment of expenses incurred in defending the girl up to that 
time. In holding that the primary carrier must reim-
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burse the secondary or excess carrier for expenses in-
curred in defending the driver the court said: 
Since Freeport's policy does cover Gail Saraniecki 
and is therefore primary, whe hold that Freeport 
is also primarily responsible for the defense of 
this suit. While it is true that Fireman's policy 
also obligates them to defend, we think the policy 
must be read as a whole, (Fogelmark v. Western 
Casualty and Surety Company, 11 Ill. App. 2d 
551, 137 N.E. 2d 879) and this obligation viewed 
in light of its position as an excess carrier in this 
particular situation. (173 N.E. 2d 543, 546.} 
The court further stated on the same page in adopting 
the words of the court in American Surety Company of 
New York v. Canal Insurance Comparny, 4 Cir., 258 F. 
2d 934: 
Losses should not fall irrevocably upon that in-
surer which first recognizes its obligations, while 
one neglectful of its duty is allowed to escape. 
In the American Surety Company case as cited in the pre-
ceding paragraph, an excess insurer had investigated 
and defended a tort action against its insured after the 
primary insurer had been tendered the defense and had 
refused it, and the insured was held liable for an amount 
in excess of the primary insurance which the excess in-
surer paid. There the court allowed the excess insurer 
to recover from the primary insurer the limits of the 
primary policy as well as all costs, expenses, and attor-
neys' fees incurred in the investigation and defense of 
the tort claim. 
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The primary insurer was also held primarily re-
sponsible for defending its insured in McFarland v. 
Chicago Exp., 7 Cir., 200 F. 2d 5 (1952), Oil Base, Inc. v. 
Transport Indemnity Company, 143 Cal. App. 2d 453, 
299 P. 2d 952 (1956). 
Other cases involving the problem of recovery of 
attorney fees and costs by an excess insurance carrier 
against a primary insurance carrier are as follows: Conti-
nental Casualty Company v. American Fidelity and 
CasuaUy Company, 275 F. 2d 381. Each company claimed 
to be the excess carrier. The court awarded plaintiff who 
was established as the excess carrier in the action the 
amount of the judgment against the insured plus attor-
ney fees for defending the action. 
Allstate Insurance Company v. Hartford Accident 
and Indemnity Company, 311 S.W. 2d 41 (Mo., 1958). Ex-
cess carrier was awarded judgment it paid in behalf of 
the insured plus part of the attorney fees incurred in de-
fending the action. It excluded that part of the attorney 
fees incurred by the excess carrier in attempting to get 
the primary carrier to defend the tort action. The attor-
ney fees were separable, the total amount being $1,300.00 
of which $600.00 was spent to implead defendant primary 
carrier. This $600.00 was disallowed but plaintiff was 
allowed to recover the $700.00 spent in defending the tort 
action. 
In Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance Company v. Con-
tinental Casualty Company, 147 A. 2d 529 (N.J. 1959) the 
court found neither party to be the primary insurance 
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carrier and on that basis required the companies to split 
the cost of settlement and fees incurred in disposing of 
the claim against the insured. 
In view of the facts involved in the case on appeal 
herein and the cases cited in this brief, appellant contends 
that as long as Farmers Insurance Exchange disclaimed 
coverage and refused to participate in any way in either 
negotiating settlement or defending the action against 
John H. Morgan, Jr., there was no admitted or established 
"other valid and collectible insurance" available to pro-
tect the insured and National Farmers Union was, there-
fore, forced to defend and pay any resulting judgment, 
if unsuccessful in its efforts, or to settle the case. N a-
tional Farmers Union could not abandon Morgan merely 
because Farmers Insurance Exchange chose to deny 
coverage and gamble on future exoneration. Aetna Cas-
ualty v. Buckeye Union Casualty, supra. National Farm-
ers Union had an interest to protect and in defending the 
insured in the original action was not a volunteer. 
Appellant relies heavily on the case of Firemarn's 
Fund Indemnity Company v. Freeport Insurance Com-
pany (supra) and asserts that it should not be penalized 
for recognizing its obligation to one of its named insureds 
when the insurance carrier with the primary obligation to 
protect the insured refused to do so. That appellant was 
successful in its defense of Mr. Morgan should not be to 
its detriment. There can be no question that upon the 
principles of equity and natural justice, and upon the 
law, that National Farmers Union has the right to re-
cover the attorney fees and court costs incurred by it in 
10 
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successfully defending the insured party. Farmers In-
surance Exchange should not be permitted to escape ulti-
mate liability costs and expenses incurred in defending 
the insured merely by denying coverage and refusing to 
defend the action. The Exchange should not be immu-
nized from such payments by its own breach of contract. 
See Klaustermeyer v. Clevela;nd Trust Company, As-
signee, 89 Ohio St. 142, 105 N.E. 278. 
PoiNT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AL-
LOW PLAINTIFF RECOVERY OF ATTOR-
NEY FEES AND COURT COSTS INCURRED 
IN DEFENDING THE INSURED ON THE 
THEORY OF SUBROGATION. 
It is well settled that one secondarily liable, who is 
forced to pay because of the refusal or failure after de-
mand, of the one primarily liable to discharge the o bliga-
tion, has the right of indemnity from the one primarily 
liable. Globe Indemnity Company v. Schmitt, 142 Ohio St. 
595, 53 N.E. 2d 790, Maryland Casualty Compan.y v. Fred-
erick Company, 142 Ohio St. 605, 53 N.E. 2d 795, Losito 
v. Kruse, Jr., 136 Ohio St. 183, 24 N.E. 2d 705, 126 ALR 
1194, Herron v. City of Y oun,gstown, 136 Ohio St. 190, 24 
N.E. 2d 708, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1324 et seq. 
However, the doctrine of subrogation, which is a de-
vice for the protection of a surety or indemnifier, is be-
cause of its very nature inapplicable where the one seek-
ing subrogation is himself primarily liable. Builders and 
Manufacturers' Mutual Casualty Company v. Preferred 
11 
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Auto Insurance Comp~y (1941 C.A. 6th Ohio) 118 F. 2d 
118. By the same token, the doctrine is inapplicable if 
the one against whom subrogation is sought is not found 
to be the primary insurer. Michig(JJJ'b Alkali Company v. 
Bankers Indemnity Company (1939, C.A. 2d NY) 103 F. 2d 
345. And it has been held not to apply where the effect of 
the respective policies was to establish equal liability. 
Kenner v. Century Indemnity Company, 320 Mass. 6, 67 
N.E. 2d 769, 165 ALR. 1463. 
The District Court per Judge Ellett in the instant 
case held that National Farmers Property and Casualty 
Company, appellant herein, was the excess carrier and 
that Farmers Insurance Exchange, respondent herein, 
was the primary carrier, but refused to allow recovery 
of defense costs and court costs under the theory of sub-
rogation on the ground that such a theory is inapplicable 
where no payment has been made under the policy, i.e., 
where the insured did not incur any defense costs or court 
costs and since the company did not make any such pay-
ments for its insured then the insurance company could 
not subrogate for the costs and the expenses incurred 
by it. 
Appellant urges that the approach of the trial court 
to the subrogation attempt is academic. That the insured 
actually incurred no costs and expenses in defending the 
lawsuit because National Farmers Union undertook the 
defense of the action, engaged and paid its own attorneys 
for so doing is not to the point. It is true that appellant 
could have abandoned Mr. Morgan as did respondent, let 
the insured employ his own attorney, and actually incur 
12 
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all costs and expenses in defending himself. The insured 
could then have paid for his defense and sought reim-
bursement from his insurance carrier; appellant might 
then have reimbursed him as per the policy defenses pro-
vision and then sought recovery against the primary 
insurer. Or, appellant might have undertaken the defense 
of the insured but handled the matter in such a slothful 
manner that judgment was sure to be entered against Mr. 
Morgan. Then the excess carrier could have paid said 
judgment and sought recovery by subrogating against 
the primary carrier for the amount paid on the judgment 
plus costs and expenses incurred in defending. Such an 
approach may please the theorizing purist of the legal 
profession, but is an approach which we think the excess 
carrier need not, should not and could not pursue, nor is 
it one which the insured need put up with. The effect of 
refusing to allow the appellant to recover expenses and 
costs on this ground is to penalize it for realizing its obli-
gation in defending the insured when respondent aban-
doned him and then for its efficient and successful han-
dling of the lawsuit against him. 
The problem of subrogation against a judgment 
creditor for costs expended by an insurance com-
pany in successfully defending its insured was dis-
cussed in Mu'J'Wh Brewery, Inc., v. Grief, 6 N.Y. S. 2d 989, 
169 Mis. 382 (1928) and on appeal in 11 N. Y. S. 2d 126 
(1939). That matter involved a motion to vacate and set 
aside a subpoena for examination in supplemental pro-
ceedings of judgment debtor, Abraham Grief. In an 
action that resulted in the judgment against Grief, 
13 
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judgment-debtors, plaintiffs, had instituted an action 
against Munch Brewery and South Brooklyn Rail-
way Company for personal injuries. Zurich Gen-
eral Accident and Liability Insurance Company, the 
insurance carrier of judgment-creditor, Munch Brewery, 
Inc., defended the action and was successful in getting a 
no cause of action plus costs judgment for its insured. 
The costs of $133.00 had been incurred by the insurance 
company and not by the insured. It was in an attempt to 
recover these costs on the theory of subrogation that the 
insurance carrier had instituted the supplemental pro-
ceedings. The policy issued by Zurich to 11unch Brewery 
contained standard provisions for legal liability for bod-
ily injuries or death, expenses for defenses and 
subrogation. 
The trial court indicated that the subrogation clause 
of the policy comes into play only where the insurance 
company has had to pay a loss for damages. In 6 NYS 
2d 989, 992, the court said: 
If a judgment had been obtained against the 
Munch Brewery, Inc., and was paid by the insur-
ance carrier, in that event the carrier would by 
virtue of the subrogation clause have a right of 
action against the driver of the truck owned by the 
insured or against co-defendant whose contribu-
tory negligence might have resulted in the injury 
sustained. 
The court further asserted that subrogation applies 
to a right in the insurance company only in the event of 
a payment under the policy. There must be payment by 
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the company for and on behalf of its insured and until the 
insurance carrier paid a claim or judgment it could not 
bring an action as subrogee because its rights as subro-
gee does not accrue until then. 
Defendant's motion to vacate the subpoena for ex-
amination in supplemental proceedings was granted. 
On appeal to the appellate division of the Supreme 
Court, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 126, the lower court was reversed. 
At page 127, relating to the subrogation question, the 
court said that pursuant to the policy the insurance com-
pany undertook to pay, in addition to damages, all ex-
penses incurred by the company for investigation, 
negotiation or defense. The Court then went on to say: 
The insurance company is entitled to be subro-
gated to the rights of the assured against the judg-
ment-debtor ''as respects any payment made un-
der this policy,'' for it had borne the expenses 
which the judgment for costs was designed to 
compensate. For the purpose of determining the 
rightful claimant of the judgment for costs, the 
insurance company was the actual defendant, and 
Munch Brewery, Inc., was simply the nominal de-
fendant. McGregor v. Comstock, 28 N.Y. 237. 
There are few other cases in point, but those that 
are indicate that a liability carrier providing secondary 
insurance, and compelled to pay a claim on behalf of an 
insured for whose benefit primary insurance affording 
coverage is subsisting, will be permitted to be subrogated 
to the rights of the insured against the latter insurer, both 
on the ground of general equitable principles and by vir-
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tue of any subrogation clause which may be contained 
within the policy issued by the secondary insurer. 
In Bennett v. Preferred Accident Insurance Com-
parny (1951, CA lOth Okla.) 192 F. 2d 748, the court based 
its decision upon an equitable doctrine of subrogation de-
scribed as a device designed to compel, where justified by 
the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the 
ultimate discharge of a debt or obligation by him who in 
good conscience ought to pay it. 
In the case on appeal herein appellant incurred attor-
ney fees and court costs in defending the insured and pay-
ment for same was made under the policy issued by 
National Farmers Union to John Morgan. Pursuant to 
the Grief a;nd Bennet cases, appellant should be permitted 
to recover the expenses and costs on the basis of subro-
gation. It is true that Daniel T. Wolfe was the judgment-
debtor in the action against appellant's insured, but 
Farmers Insurance Group was defendant in the action 
brought by National Farmers Union. Since the sum 
sought to be recovered was expended by and for respond-
ents' insured by the terms of appellants' policy and which 
amounts should rightly have been paid by respondents in 
accordance with the terms of its policy, it is submitted 
that National Farmers Union is entitled to and should be 
permitted to recover, on the theory of subrogation, the 
expenses and costs incurred by it in defending the in-
sured individual. 
See also Stan,dard Surety and Casualty Company v. 
Metropolitoo Casualty Compa,ny, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 428, 67 
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N.E. 2d 634 (1945), Maryland Casualty Company v. Hub-
bard (1938, D. C. Calif.), 22 F. Supp. 697, National Mu-
tual Insurance Company v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company (1952) 90 App. D.C. 362, 196 F. 2d 597. 
PoiNT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT AND FAILING TO 
GRANT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAIN-
TIFF AND AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
On the basis of the law and argument set forth under 
Point I and Point II herein which appellant incorporates 
and makes a part of its argument under this Point, appel-
lant urges that the action of the trial court in dismissing 
plaintiff's Complaint and failing to grant it judgment 
against defendant was in error. 
Appellant contends under the cases decided in the 
jurisdictions mentioned coupled with the principles of 
equity, and natural justice, that it should be permitted 
to recover the attorney fees and court costs incurred in 
defending the insured of both parties to this appeal. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
AMEND THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW TO PROPERLY RE-
FLECT WHAT WAS FOUND AS FACTS BY 
THE COURT. 
Appellant objected to the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law as entered by the trial court and made a 
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motion to have same modified. The trial court refused to 
modify the Findings or Conclusions. The error claimed 
by appellant in the trial court's action is as follows: 
a. that the judgment entered is based on findings 
of fact and conclusions of law not in accordance 
with the record and should, therefore, be reversed. 
b. that the record does not and will not support 
the judgment entered and it should, therefore, be 
reversed; and 
c. that the findings of fact are not in accordance 
with the record and are not sufficient to support 
the judgment entered and the court should, there-
fore, have amended same. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument and authorities, it 
appears clear that this court should reverse the decision 
and judgment of the District Court and should find the 
issues in favor of the plaintiff and should direct the lower 
court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
18 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appell(Jffbt. 
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